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The paper provides a survey of fiscal and monetary policies during the 1930s under the Hoover and
Roosevelt Administrations and how they influenced the policies during the recent Great Recession.
The discussion of the causal impacts of monetary policy focuses on papers written in the last decade
and the findings of scholars using dynamic structural general equilibrium modeling.  The discussion
of fiscal policy shows why economists do not see the New Deal as a Keynesian stimulus, describes
the significant shift toward excise taxation during the 1930s, and surveys estimates of the impact of
federal spending on local economies.  The paper concludes with discussion of the lessons for the present








Economists and economic historians generally agree that the Federal Reserve made 
several decisions about monetary policy between 1929 and 1937 that worsened the Great 
Depression.  The Federal Reserve allowed the money supply to fall and did too little, too late in 
trying to stave off the bank failures of the early 1930s.  The Fed then reduced the money supply 
again by raising reserve requirements three times in 1936 and 1937 in an attempt to prevent 
inflation by soaking up excess reserves.   As a broad brush explanation of the reasons for the 
Federal Reserve’s choices, most scholars agree that the Federal Reserve’s attempts to maintain 
the international Gold Standard between 1929 and 1933 explain a significant amount of why they 
followed their policy actions.  Week-by-week accounts of the timing of bank failures and the 
Federal Reserve’s policy moves, however, suggest a complex set of motives for the actions of 
the Fed and regional Reserve Banks that add a great deal more nuance to the story.   
  The largest debates about monetary policies during the 1930s arise over how effective 
they were in driving real GDP and unemployment.  Nearly all agree that the Federal Reserve 
policy interacted with other negative shocks in ways that caused the Depression to deepen.  The 
question remains how much?   Estimates from a variety of models suggest that the impact of 
monetary policy explains a range of 20 to 70 percent of the decline in real output between 1929 
and 1933.  Some scholars argue that the recovery that started in mid1933 was driven by 
Roosevelt administration’s adoption of a new “reflationary” policy regime that simultaneously 
freed the U.S. from the “golden fetters” of the Gold Standard, shifted to a looser monetary 
policy, and ramped up government spending just after the inauguration in 1933.   The shock of a 
new policy dogma reversed deflationary expectations that contributed to most of the recovery.  
Later efforts by the Federal Reserve to combat potential inflation through increases in reserve 4 
 
requirements and cuts in federal spending signaled another policy regime change that contributed 
to the downturn of 1937-38.  
How effective was fiscal policy?   A nationwide Keynesian fiscal stimulus was never 
really attempted in the 1930s.  During the Hoover Presidency Congress doubled federal spending 
and ramped up federal lending through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.  The Roosevelt 
Congresses then spent nearly double the Hoover levels.  But both administrations collected 
enough taxes in a variety of new forms to maintain relatively small deficits throughout the 
period.  Relative to a Keynesian deficit target designed to return to full employment, the deficits 
were miniscule.  State governments also ran deficits in the early 1930s and then expanded 
taxation and ran surplus in the late 1930s.  Even if fiscal deficits had been run, Christina Romer’s 
(1992) estimates of fiscal and monetary policy multipliers from 1921 and 1938 imply a weak 
effect of fiscal policy.   Studies of the impact of government spending at the state, county, and 
city level suggest that impact on real variables differed by program.    Public works and relief 
spending contributed to increases in economic activity, while the farm programs were explicitly 
designed to reduce output.   Preliminary estimates of the impact of net federal spending using 
annual data for 48 states between 1930 and 1940 suggest that a marginal increase of $1 in net 
federal spending was associated with an increase of $1 to $1.50 in per capita personal income in 
the states.   
  The insistence upon raising tax rates during the 1930s also likely retarded growth.  The 
Hawley-Smoot Tariff of 1930 touched off a series of protectionist responses from other countries 
that cut world import activity by two-thirds by 1933.    Increases in income tax rates, particularly 
spikes in the top marginal rates to 58 and 67 percent, likely contributed to tax avoidance and 
inhibited economic activities at the top of the income distribution.  A series of taxes on capital, 5 
 
dividends, and undistributed profits led to relatively small amounts of revenue at the cost of 
chilling some forms of investment activity.  New excise taxes on bank checks, autos, electricity, 
pipelines, gasoline, and communications likely slowed growth in the leading technological 
growth sectors in the economy.  The new excise taxes along with renewed collections on 
alcoholic beverages after the end of Prohibition account for a significant part of the rise in tax 
revenues during the 1930s.   
  Modern policy makers have clearly sought to avoid making the macroeconomic policy 
mistakes of the 1930s.  In contrast to the 1930s, the Federal Reserve, guided by Depression 
scholar Benjamin Bernanke, has flooded the banking system with liquidity since fall 2008.  The 
Bush and Obama administrations fought the downturn with tax rebates in 2008 and 2009.   The 
new Obama administration and the Democratic Congress pushed through a fiscal stimulus 
package that has driven the federal deficit near 10 percent of GDP, the largest peace-time deficit 
in American history.   
On the microeconomic side, policy makers followed several strategies that mimic the 
activities of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in the 1930s.  Bernanke and Treasury 
Secretaries Henry Paulson and Timothy Geithner orchestrated mergers, bailouts, and ownership 
stakes in major financial institutions to stave off anticipated financial disaster if an institution 
that was too big to fail went under.  As the RFC did with the railroads and other industries, the 
Bush and Obama administrations made substantial loans to GM and Chrysler.   
  The paper follows the path laid out in the introduction.  I describe the monetary policies 
under the Hoover Administration, discuss why the policies were chosen, describe the shift in 
monetary policy under Roosevelt, and then discuss extraordinary banking policies that set 6 
 
precedents for the bailouts, bank investments, and stress tests introduced in 2008 and 2009.   I 
then address the modern versions of the debates over the causal impact of monetary policy with 
particular attention to dynamic structural general equilibrium modeling.  Following an 
examination of the fiscal policies of Hoover and Keynes in the light of Keynesian economics, I 
discuss estimates of the impact of federal spending on local economies, describe the supply-side 
aspects of the rise in tax rates, and conclude with further discussion of the lessons for the present 
from 1930s monetary and fiscal policy.   
Monetary Policy under the Hoover Administration  
Nearly everybody agrees with Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz (1963) that the 
Federal Reserve’s monetary policy contributed to making the Great Contraction worse between 
1929 and 1933.  At the time the Fed had two effective tools for influencing the money supply, 
open market operations and the discount rate at which the Fed allowed  member banks to borrow 
(or discount bills to the Fed) to meet reserve requirements.  The open market operations involved 
the purchase or sale of existing bonds.  Reductions in the discount rate and purchases of bonds 
could be used to reduce the probability of bank failures in a panic and both contributed to 
increases in the money supply.  Thus, if the Fed had focused on combating bank failures and 
unemployment within the U.S. economy, the appropriate strategy was to lower the discount rate 
and purchase bonds. 
Yet, the Federal Reserve also paid close attention to the international gold standard, 
which was essentially a promise that the Federal Reserve and U.S. banks would pay out an ounce 
of gold for every $20.67 in Federal Reserve notes.  To remain on the gold standard, the Federal 
Reserve was required to provide adequate U.S. gold reserves to make this promise credible.  If 7 
 
changes in the relative attractiveness of the dollar led the U.S. supply of gold to fall below the 
appropriate level, the Fed was expected to take actions to make the dollar more attractive.  At the 
time the standard policies in response to gold outflows included raising the discount rate and 
selling (or at least reducing purchases) of existing bonds.   
Figures 1 through 4 and Table 1 show the monthly movements over the period from 
January 1929 through February 1933 of series representing two of the major dilemmas for 
monetary policy-- the nominal volume of deposits in suspended banks (diamonds in the figures) 
and the change in the U.S. gold stock (circles in the figures).  Each figure shows how specific 
measures of Federal Reserve activity were changing in response to these dilemmas, including 
changes in the Federal Reserve’s holdings of U.S. Securities (squares in Figure 1), the level of 
the New York Fed’s discount rate (squares in Figure 2), changes in the Fed’s holdings of bills 
purchased (squares in Figure 3), and changes in the member bank borrowing at the Fed (squares 
in Figure 4).  The bills purchased refer to short term credit instruments known as bankers’ 
acceptances and trade acceptances that Federal Reserve banks could purchase in the open 
market.  These are the types of “real bills” discussed in the real bill’s doctrine described below.  
At the founding of the Federal Reserve, changes in bills purchased were expected to be a major 
aspect of policy, as they were in England at the time.  In the 1920s, however, open market 
purchases and sales of U.S. securities became the main source of adjustment and policy 
operations (Meltzer 2003, 270).   
The Federal Reserve’s attempts to slow the speculative boom in stocks contributed to 
slowing the money supply between 1928 and 1929.   Soon after the recession started in August 
1929, the Dow Jones Stock Index peaked in early September.  For most of October the Fed had 
been selling U.S. securities, but this policy changed swiftly when the Dow Jones Index dropped 8 
 
24 percent on Monday October 28 and Black Tuesday October 29.  The New York Fed 
responded immediately by purchasing $115 million in U.S. securities.  Two days later the 
Federal Reserve Board agreed that it was the proper move.   The entire Fed system purchased 
$157 million in U.S. securities the last week of October and then purchased on net another $161 
million in November and $131 million in December in Figure 1 and Table 1.   The New York 
Fed lowered its discount rate in Figure 2 and Table 1 from 6 to 5 percent on November 1 and 
then to 4.5 percent by November 15 after the Dow dropped to roughly two-thirds of its October 
25
th level by November 11 (Meltzer, 2003, 284-288).     
The Fed’s response to bank failures over the next three years varied from crisis to crisis.  
Over most of the year 1930 the Fed made policy adjustments in response to gold flows and 
seasonal demands for credit.  The spike in suspended bank deposits (diamonds in the figures) in 
November and December 1930 in Figure 1 and Table 1 led the New York Fed to purchase $100 
million in U.S. securities and $75 million in bankers’ acceptances (bills purchased in Figure 3) 
between November 30 and December 17
th.   It then sold $50 million in the middle of the month.  
The New York Fed then lowered its discount rate from 2.5 to 2 percent in Figure 2 and Table 1 
and purchased more than $100 million in bankers’ acceptances and $85 million in U.S. securities 
in the last week of December (Meltzer 2003, 325).  The rest of the regional Federal Reserve 
banks were leaning the other way, however, as the Fed systems’ stock of U.S. securities rose by 
only $45 million in December in Figure 1 and Table 1 and the stock of acceptances rose by only 
$73 million that month.   
The Fed faced its ultimate dilemma between August and October of 1931 in Figures 1, 2, 
3, and 4 and Table 1 when the volume of deposits suspended spiked again and a dramatic 
outflow of gold occurred after Britain left the gold standard in September of 1931.  Until October 9 
 
the Fed’s primary focus was international.  During the first part of the summer the Fed worried 
about a flight of gold out of Eastern Europe and Germany into the U.S. associated with possible 
coups and the rise of Hitler.  In response, the Fed participated in loans to banks in Hungary, the 
German Reichsbank, and the Austrian National Bank.  In late July, the Fed approved a purchase 
of $125 million in prime commercial bills guaranteed by the Bank of England to aid a crumbling 
situation in Britain.  After Britain left the gold standard on September 20 and gold started 
flowing out of the country, the Fed followed the standard responses.  First it purchased U.S. 
securities, although the holdings of U.S. securities in Figure 1 and Table 1 changed very little 
relative to the changes in gold stocks or in bank suspensions during this period.  The New York 
Fed then raised its discount rate in Figure 2 and Table 1  from 1.5 percent to 2.5 percent on 
October 9 and then to 3.5 percent on October 16 (Meltzer 2003, 332-48).   
The memo for the Open Market Policy Committee (OMPC) meeting on October 26 
finally focused more attention on the bank failures than the gold outflows, but this did not lead to 
much of a change in OMPC policy.  The OMPC chose not to make any major open market 
purchases of U.S. securities.  Instead, the OMPC recommended that member banks should be 
encouraged to lend to banks in difficulty and then rediscount those loans to the Federal Reserve 
system banks.  Most of the action was driven by the decisions of the member banks.  Despite the 
higher discount rates in October, member banks sharply increased their borrowing at the Fed’s 
discount window in Figure 4 and Table 1 and sold a large amount of bankers’ acceptances to the 
Fed (Figure 3 and Table 1).  Meltzer (2003, 348) argues that the Fed did more to prop up the 
Bank of England than it did for the American banking system.    
The wave of bank failures over the summer led President Herbert Hoover to call for a 
new set of extraordinary measures outside the Federal Reserve.  He met with bankers in October 10 
 
1932 to establish the National Credit Corporation (NCC).  The NCC was designed as a way for 
commercial banks to pool resources voluntarily to purchase marketable assets of insolvent banks 
and to provide alternative borrowing facilities for the banks based on assets that the Fed could 
not accept as collateral.    
At the November 30 OMPC meeting, the committee members expressed satisfaction at 
their handling of the gold outflow.  Essentially, they felt that they had stemmed the tide of the 
gold flow and meanwhile had done the right thing for the bank failures by lending a great deal at 
high discount rates, as seen in Figures 2 and 4 and Table 1.  They had not purchased securities to 
stave off the banking crisis, but seemed satisfied that that was the right course (Meltzer 2003, 
348-9).  They approved the capacity to purchase $200 million in U.S. securities in open market 
operations but then sell them again in response to the seasonal demands for credit.   
A new wave of bank suspensions hit in December 1931 and January 1932, but not much 
was done.  The NCC made $155 million in loans to 575 banks but December 1931 still had the 
third highest monthly volume of deposits suspended in the early 1930s.  The Hoover 
administration started developing the plans for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), 
which would become a government corporation with the authority to lend to banks and 
businesses and the Glass-Steagall Act of 1932, which expanded the range of assets on which the 
Fed could provide credits to member banks.   Despite the authority to make $200 million in U.S. 
security purchases, the Fed did not respond to the bank failures with purchases of U.S. securities.  
Instead, they sought to time purchases to the passage of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
and the Glass-Steagall Act of 1932 (Meltzer, 2003, 357-361). 11 
 
 Finally, between February and June 1932 the Federal Reserve purchased slightly more 
than $1 billion in U.S. government securities.  Meanwhile the RFC seemed to be much more 
active in trying to prevent prevent bank failures by making $784 million in loans to more than 
4,000 banks between February and November of 1932.
1   Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argue 
that had the $1 billion in open market purchases of U.S. securities been completed during the 
first wave of bank failures in late 1930, the move would have been effective at stemming the 
crisis in 1930 and stalling the drop in the money supply that followed.  The economy would have 
been in a much better position when the next crises hit, or some of the later crises would have 
been prevented or softened significantly.  In their view, the $1 billion purchase in 1932 was “too 
little, too late.”   
After the major open market purchases ended in the summer of 1932 Fed policy was 
relatively passive.  When a new wave of bank failures hit in December 1932 and the first two 
months of 1933, the Fed did little.  Meanwhile, President Hoover and President-Elect Roosevelt 
could not come to an agreement on how to deal with the latest wave of suspensions of over 500 
small banks between December and February.  Hoover pressed Roosevelt to join him in 
developing a policy to counteract the bank failures but demanded that Roosevelt promise to stay 
on the Gold Standard and run a balanced budget.   Roosevelt did not want to make such 
commitments or accept responsibility for a joint policy until he had actual authority.  Meanwhile, 
state governments took action to prevent the failures, as 35 states declared bank holidays and the 
remaining states put strong restrictions on withdrawals (Meltzer 2003, p. 379-380).    





A significant amount of the Fed’s actions can be understood by examining its 
international role in defending the gold standard (Eichengreen 1992, Temin and Wigmore 1990, 
Temin 1989).    Until 1933 the Fed maintained a commitment to the international gold standard, 
a commitment that tied its hands to some degree.   Even though the money supply and the 
economy was continuing to decline, outflows of gold when Britain left the gold standard in 1931 
and during the banking crisis in March of 1933 led the Fed to raise the discount rate.  Once the 
U.S. left the gold standard in 1933, it was freer to focus on domestic policy and the money 
supply.    
Friedman and Schwartz argued that the Federal Reserve lacked the right type of strong 
leadership.  Benjamin Strong, a powerful advocate for use of open market purchases of U.S. 
securities during recessions in the 1920s as the head of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, had 
died in 1928.  Even though his replacement George Harrison and several others argued for  
expansive bond purchases at various times in the early 1930s, they were overridden by the rest of 
the Fed policy makers, who tended to hold the view that Fed interference would either prolong 
the problems or have little agreement.  . 
Not all agree that the Fed had changed directions with the death of Benjamin Strong.   
When Alan Meltzer (2003, 284-411) wrote his majestic history of the Federal Reserve System, 
he had access to many internal documents that had not been available to Friedman and Schwartz.  
He draws more nuanced conclusions about the internal policy debates within the Fed, as well as 
the attitudes of Strong’s replacement as head of the New York Fed, George Harrison.  Between 
1929 and 1933 the most common view held by the Fed policy makers was a combination of the 13 
 
“real bills doctrine” and the Riefler-Burgess framework.
2   Under the real bills doctrine increases 
in credit should be provided by the Federal Reserve by purchasing commercial bills of exchange 
or bankers’ acceptances because they arise from the financing of trade or production.   The idea 
was that credit and output would expand together and thus not be inflationary.  Credit expansion 
based on Fed purchases of government securities was considered to be speculative credit because 
no new production resulted.   Real bills analysts wanted the member banks to initiate the 
demands for credit and to avoid having the Fed provide “redundant” or “speculative” credit 
(Meltzer 263, 411)”   
The Riefler-Burgess framework “explained that banks were reluctant to borrow, 
borrowed only if reserves were deficient, and repaid promptly.  To repay borrowing, banks 
called loans, raised lending rates, and sold government securities….A rise in the discount rate 
lowered the level of member bank borrowing, reduced credit and money, and raised market 
interest rates (Meltzer 2003, 161).”  Meanwhile, open market purchases of U.S. securities 
supplied reserves and encouraged banks to repay borrowing, offer more loans, and reduce 
interest rates; open market sales drove banks to borrow, restrict lending, and raise interest rates.  
The doctrine suggested that the key variables to look at were member bank borrowing and 
interest rates.  If both were low, policy was easy.  If the two were high, policy was tight.  The cut 
point was $500 million for borrowing (Meltzer 2003, 734-5).   Meltzer found that the Fed leaders 
spent very little time looking at the sharp decline in the money supply, although in late 1931 and 





 There were disagreements among the members of the Board of Governors and the 
OMPC.  At various times one or more members advocated expansionary open market purchases 
of U.S. securities.  Yet, in most situations there were always real bills and Riefler- Burgess 
advocates who saw low member bank borrowing and low interest rates and felt that monetary 
policy was sufficiently easy.  Several of the decisions makers argued that prior attempts to 
promote recovery with open market purchases of U.S. securities had had little effect in the 1930s 
and had promoted speculation in the 1920s.  Even during the $1 billion open market purchase of 
U.S. securities in 1932 some members of the OMPC were not fully on board.  Most of the 
regional banks allowed the New York Fed to make most of the purchases.  The members of the 
OMPC went ahead with the purchases in part because banks were already borrowing a great 
deal, so that Fed officials saw the purchases as a means of allowing the member banks to replace 
borrowing without promoting inflation.  Further, Fed officials were worried that if they did not 
act, Congress might pass much more inflationary acts in the form of the World War I Veterans’ 
Bonus and a new bill to expand the printing of greenbacks (Meltzer 2003, 358-361).   
One reason so many officials thought the policy was easy is that they did not adjust 
nominal interest rates for the high rate of deflation.  Meltzer (2003, 411) finds no mention of 
officials adjusting the nominal rate for deflation and discussing the implications of a high real 
rate of interest.   The Fed cut the nominal discount rate shown in Figures 2 and 5 and Table 1 in 
eleven steps from 6 percent in October 1929 to 1.5 percent in 1931.  But in that same time span, 
the Consumer Price Index inflation rate in Figure 5 was near zero in 1929, and then became a 
deflation rate of -2.4 percent in 1930 and -9 percent in 1931.  This meant that the ex-post real 
discount rate, the discount rate minus the inflation rate, rose slightly from 4.5 to 4.77 percent in 
1930 and then jumped to 10.5 percent in 1931.  The Fed raised the discount rate back to 3.5 15 
 
percent in late 1931 to stem the outward flow of gold when Britain abandoned the gold standard.  
Then the Fed allowed it fall to 2.5 percent for most of 1932.  Yet, the 10 percent deflation rate 
that year caused the real ex-post discount rate to rise to 12.5 percent.  Even though low nominal 
interest rates led Fed officials to believe the monetary policy was easy, the effects of deflation 
drove the real interest rates to levels that were than two times as high as any real interest rate 
experienced in the U.S after 1933.  
Karl Brunner and Meltzer (1968) and Elmus Wicker (1966) argue that the Fed’s policy 
objectives were similar in the 1920s and the early 1930s.  David Wheelock (1992) builds on their 
work by combining narrative discussions with time series regressions to estimate the relationship 
between Federal Reserve policy tools and various economic targets.  He then uses the 
regressions to identify the Fed’s policy regimes and shows that the Fed responded to changes to 
the domestic and international changes of the 1930s with largely the same proportionate 
responses as they had in the 1920s.    
Wheelock argues that the Fed policy makers did not realize that the same proportionate 
responses were not enough to offset the drastic downturn that was taking place.   For example, 
the Federal Reserve and state bank regulators allowed an average of 630 banks per year to 
suspend operations between 1920 and 1929 because they believed them to be weaker banks that 
normally would not survive in a market economy.    Analyses of individual bank failures in the 
1920s and 1930s by Charles Calomiris and Joseph Mason (2003) and Kris Mitchener (2005) 
suggest that most of the failures in the early 1930s also fit this pattern as well.  As a result, many 
of the regional Federal Reserve banks felt comfortable in following the same lender of last resort 
policies they had followed in the 1920s.  The difference between the early 1930s and the 1920s 
was the sheer scale of the failures and the economy-wide problems.  The number of banks fell 16 
 
from 25 thousand to 17.8 thousand between 1930 and 1933.  The shares of deposits in suspended 
banks rose to 2 percent in 1930, 4.5 percent in 1931, 2.4 percent in 1932, and 11 percent in 1933.   
It was likely that the banks failing in the early 1930s, having already survived through the 1920s, 
were generally stronger, but they were hit by far worse circumstances in the 1930s as output 
dropped sharply in every state.  Thus, the Federal Reserve policy rules were not enough to 
prevent failure due to the extraordinary circumstances of the 1930s.
3   
Monetary Policy During the Roosevelt Administration     
After taking office on March 4, 1933, Roosevelt made sweeping changes.  Within two 
months he had taken the U.S. off of the Gold Standard.  The removal of the “Golden Fetters” and 
the devaluation of the dollar to $35 dollars per ounce of gold combined with political events in 
Europe to cause a flow of gold into America.   The economy began to recover.  This same 
pattern was repeated throughout the world.  In country after country as central banks sought to 
maintain the gold standard, their domestic economies continued to sink.   As each left the gold 
standard, their economies rebounded (Temin and Wigmore 1990; Eichengreen 1992). 
The New York Fed cut the discount rate from 3.5 to 3 percent in early April.   Eugene 
Black, the Governor of the Atlanta Federal Reserve bank became the Chair of Federal Reserve 
Board in May 1933.   The Atlanta Fed was known for providing more liquidity during bank runs 
than most of the other regional Feds between 1930 and 1932 (Richardson and Troost, 2009).  
Under the new leadership the Fed cut the discount rate again in May 1933 from 3 to 2.5 percent.  
The rate in Figure 5 fell to 2 percent by the end of the year, to 1.5 percent in 1934, and then to 1 
                                                            
3In some cases increased state enforcement and monitoring activity actually made the situation 
worse for some banks.  Richardson and Van Horn (2009) find that a change in monitoring 
activity by New York state banking officials may well have contributed to the failure of a 
number of banks in New York in the summer of 1932. 17 
 
percent in 1937, where it stayed for the rest of the decade.   The rates stayed low in real terms as 
well.  The highest ex-post real rates occurred at around 2 and 3 percent in the deflationary years 
of 1938 and 1939.   In 1934 an inflation rate above 7 percent led to a real discount rate of 
negative 6 percent, while a 4-percent inflation in 1937 led to a negative 2.5 percent rate.    In 
terms of open market operations, the Federal Reserve’s holdings of securities were roughly 
steady around $2.5 billion dollars between 1934 and 1939 (Wheelock 2006, 3-624 to 3-629).   
The Federal Reserve was given direct administrative control over the reserve 
requirements of member banks when it was reorganized under the Banking Act of 1935.   Under 
the fractional reserve system member banks were required to hold a share of deposits in reserve 
at the Federal Reserve.  By 1935 the economy had been moving through two years of recovery.  
Real GDP growth was very rapid, in large part because the economy was starting from a base 
that was 36 percent below the level in 1929.  The number unemployed had dropped significantly, 
although they still composed over 15 percent of the labor force.  Noting that banks were holding 
large reserves above and beyond the required reserve requirements, the Fed began worrying 
about the possibility of inflation.  If the banks started lending out their excess reserves, the Fed 
worried that the rise in the money supply would lead to rapid inflation that would halt the 
recovery.  The Federal Reserve doubled the long standing reserve requirements in three steps on 
August 16, 1936, March 1, 1937 and May 1, 1937.   The Fed had not recognized that the banks 
were holding so many excess reserves to protect themselves against bank runs.  The experience 
of the past decade had given the banks little confidence that the Fed would act as a lender of last 
resort.   Therefore, the banks increased their reserves to make sure that they retained some excess 18 
 
reserves as a cushion.  These changes were followed by a spike in unemployment to 19 percent, 
and a decline in real GDP growth in 1937-38.
4 
Extraordinary Banking Policies in the 1930s 
Banking policy in the 1930s was not confined to the actions of the Federal Reserve.  
Precedents were set for Treasury Secretary Paulson to establish government ownership stakes in 
banks 2008 and for Secretary Geithner to seek extra certifications of the quality of bank assets 
before allowing banks to buy back the government’s ownership positions. 
 In February 1932 the Hoover administration established the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation (RFC).  Its first moves included making loans to 4,000 banks, railroads, credit 
unions and mortgage loan companies to provide assets that would jumpstart commercial lending.  
Among the most important programs was the provision of loans to troubled banks to seek to 
provide them with enough liquidity to survive bank runs.  Recent studies suggest that these initial 
loans were not successful because the RFC loans were given first priority over depositors and 
other lenders in situations where the bank failed.  As a result, banks had to hold the assets that 
they could sell most easily to insure repayment of the RFC loans.  These assets could not then be 
used to repay depositors when the bank failed.  When the RFC began to accept more risk by 
purchasing preferred stock in the troubled banks, it was more successful at staving off bank 
failures (Mason 2001; Mitchener and Mason 2010).    
                                                            
4This description is based on Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Meltzer (2003).   For a 
view that puts less emphasis on the Fed’s role, see Romer (1992).    19 
 
During a series of bank runs between October 1932 and March 1933 30 states declared 
bank holidays and the remaining states put restrictions on deposits.  Under the national Bank 
Holiday all banks and thrift institutions were temporarily closed.  Government auditors were then 
sent in to evaluate the banks and allow them to reopen if they were sound.  Conservators were 
appointed to improve the positions of the insolvent banks and the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation was given the power to subscribe to stock issues from the reorganized banks.  These 
seals of approval conferred on the reopened banks helped change expectations about the 
solvency of the bank system.
5  
The Causal Impact of Monetary Policy 
While the vast majority of economists agree that the Federal Reserve policies were 
flawed, there has been substantial debate about how much causal impact the monetary policies 
had on real GDP and unemployment.  In  A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 
Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz saw the Great Depression as one of many episodes in 
which changes in the money supply strongly influenced the path of inflation and growth in real 
output, typically measured by real Gross National Product (GNP).   The basic equation showing 
the multiplicative relationship between the money supply (M), velocity (V), the price level (P), 
and Real output (Q) is  
M V = P Q                                                                                                               1), 
The growth rate version of the equation with growth rates in lower case letters is   
m + v = p + q                                                                                                               2) 
                                                            
5See Mitchener and Mason (2010) for more detail on these extraordinary policies.   20 
 
These equations always hold in hindsight because velocity (V), the number of times the money 
supply turns over in the purchase of final goods and services, is calculated as the ratio of the 
money supply (M) to Nominal GNP (PQ). 
   In Friedman and Schwartz’s monetarist model the equation has analytical force because 
they argue that velocity moves in predictable ways.  Thus changes in the money supply will lead 
to changes in price (P) and real output (Q) in the same direction and the only question is how 
much of the change in the money supply is allocated to changes in price and real output.   Figure 
6 shows the strong relationship between indexes (1929=100) of the most liquid form of money 
(M1) and real output from 1929 through 1940 in level form.  The price level has a weaker 
relationship with the money supply during the period.   Monthly indexes (1923-1925=100) of the 
money supply and industrial production of consumer goods in Figure 7 also show the same 
strong relationships over time.    The annual growth rate version of the variables in Figure 8 
shows an even stronger visual relationship between the growth rate of the money supply and the 
growth in real GNP.   The fit between M1 growth and the inflation rate is not so good for 1930, 
1935 and 1936.   
  The strong correlations are consistent with the monetarist view, but correlation does not 
guarantee causation.  The debates in the macroeconomic literature center on the “causal” impact 
of the monetary policy on real output.  How much of the drop in real output into 1933 was 
caused by the failure to loosen monetary policy?  How much of the rise in output from 1933 
through 1937 is attributable to the reflationary monetary policy and how much of the drop in 
output from 1937 to 1938 was determined by the Fed’s increases in reserve requirements?   21 
 
  Friedman and Schwartz argued that most of the changes in the measures of the money 
supply were caused by changes in monetary policy.   On the other hand, macroeconomists of all 
stripes are aware that changes in real GDP also can cause changes in money supply measures.   
Increases in income lead people to hold more money for transactions and as assets, and vice 
versa.   Even though the velocity measure in the monetarist equation is seen as a money demand 
parameter, the money supply, prices, output, and velocity all can be seen as endogenous to the 
system, so that it is very difficult to sort out causality with ordinary least squares regressions.  
Keynesians, in particular, argued that the strong correlations between the money measures and 
real GDP were as likely to have been driven by a causal relationship that moved from a drop in 
output to a lower amount of money used in the economy.   When Peter Temin (1976) asked “Did 
Monetary Forces Cause the Great Depression,” he argued strong for unexplained drops in 
consumption as a primary cause of the Depression.  There are plenty of other culprits that have 
been identified.    
In the 1970s and 1980s numerous scholars debated the impact of the money supply using 
IS-LM frameworks to predict the impact of monetary policy on interest rates, prices, and output 
and then provided empirical tests with the extant data.  Since my charge in this paper is to 
examine the scholarship of the past two decades, I cannot cover these debates adequately.  
Jeremy Atack and Peter Passell (1994) and Gene Smiley (2002) provide readable surveys of the 
debates.  Other excellent resources on past and current debates include Randal Parker’s (2002, 
2007) interviews with the leading scholars of the Great Depression.   
Rational expectations economists argued that if enough people recognized that the 
changes in the demand they witnessed were due to changes in the amount of money available, 
they would respond by changing price but not real output.  Thus, people had to mis-estimate 22 
 
changes in monetary policy for changes in monetary policy to have a causal effect on real output 
and unemployment.  This has led scholars to focus on expectations.  For example, James 
Hamilton (1987) argues that the impact of contractionary monetary policy that started in 1928 
operated through unanticipated deflation, and after 1930, through the disruption of the real 
services of intermediation on the part of the financial sector as a consequence of banking panics.   
In Hamilton’s (1987, 145) view “it would have been difficult to design a more contractionary 
policy than that adopted in January 1928.”  As $307.8 million dollars in gold flowed to France in 
1928, the Federal Reserve raised the discount rate from 3.5 to 5 percent, sold $393 million in 
securities between December 1927 and July 1928 and cut its holdings of bankers’ acceptances in 
half by raising its buying rates from 3 to 4.5 percent.   Despite Fed leaders’ claims to the 
contrary, Hamilton is convinced the Fed was trying to slow the stock market boom.  Meanwhile, 
the stock boom led to an increased demand for loans and banks found it profitable to replace 
unborrowed reserves with borrowed reserves.   Hamilton cites evidence that many policy makers 
did not anticipate deflation, that regression models with data from 1900 to 1940 fail to predict 
deflation, and that the deflation in commodity prices caught speculators by surprise.   
 More recently, Real Business Cycle theorists have argued that a combination of large 
negative productivity shocks and ill-advised microeconomic policies designed to prop up wages 
and prices caused the downturn.   Most recent tests of the impact of monetary policy in the 
Depression have been performed in the context of macroeconomic models based on micro-
economic foundations.   These Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models start 
with a dynamic scenario where representative households with infinite lives choose consumption 
and asset levels to maximize the expected utility of their long run stream of consumption subject 
to their anticipated long run income stream.  The firms that hire the household members 23 
 
maximize their expected stream of profits.   There is typically a capital accumulation law for the 
economy.   
The models then incorporate factors that would create inefficiencies in the operation of a 
competitive economy.  Many modern scholars build on Keynes’s emphasis on “sticky wages” in 
the form of long term labor contract provisions or government policies designed to promote high 
wages.  Depression-Era policies include Hoover’s jawboning with manufacturers to get them to 
maintain higher nominal wages and the Roosevelt Administration’s pressure to keep wages high 
while industry established their Codes of Competition on the National Industrial Recovery Act 
(Bordo, Erceg, and Evans 2000; Cole and Ohanian 2004; Chari, Kehoe, and McGratton 2002 and 
2005; and Eggertsson 2009)   Like Hamilton, Benjamin Bernanke (1983) argues for a causal role 
for inefficiencies in credit markets caused by an increase in the cost of credit intermediation.  In 
particular, unanticipated deflation may have caused lenders to see many previously sound 
borrowers as un-creditworthy.   In the modern period, scholars add inefficiencies derived from 
sticky prices and some forms of regulation.    
The scholars pick or estimate a set of parameters in the model that best fit a series of 
stylized facts about features of the economy.   The model is then used to perform simulations to 
show how well the time paths associated with different policy regimes fit the actual Depression 
era data on real output, prices, investment, interest rates, and other variables of interest.    
  As one leading example, Michael Bordo, Christopher Erceg, and Charles Evans (2000) 
(henceforth known as BEE) develop a model with sticky wages to incorporate the common claim 
that manufacturing wages did not fall as much as people anticipated they should have during the 
Great Depression (Ohanian 2009, Taylor 2009).    The BEE analysis finds that contractionary 24 
 
monetary shocks account for 50 to 70 percent of the decline in real GNP between 1929 and the 
first quarter of 1933.   They find a much weaker effect of expansionary monetary policy after the 
move off of the Gold Standard in mid-1933.  They argue that the expansionary monetary policy 
had much weaker effects because the National Industrial Recovery Act raised nominal wages in 
ways that limited production and hours worked.  
  V. V. Chari, Patrick Kehoe, and Ellen McGratton (2002, 2005) reexamine the issue in the 
context of their “wedges” model of the factors that lead to Depressions.  They use simulations to 
develop measures of three wedges:  a labor wedge, an efficiency wedge, and an investment 
wedge.  Their labor wedge includes the combination of sticky wages and monetary policy shocks 
analyzed by BEE as well as the inefficiencies from NRA policies and failures to enforce antitrust 
described by Cole and Ohanian.  They describe the efficiency wedge as a result of poor 
government policy interacting with shocks.  Finally, the investment wedge is associated with 
gaps between consumer’s rates of substitution between current and future consumption and the 
marginal product of capital that might arise due to agency costs (Bernanke and Gertler 1989).  
This investment wedge might be associated with the types of extra costs of capital intermediation 
described by Bernanke (1983) for the Depression.     
The wedge model analysis tells a mixed story about the effect of monetary policy.  The 
simulations from the model do not show as strong an effect for monetary policy as the BEE 
(2000) model does.   The labor wedge, which incorporates the combination of monetary policy 
shocks and sticky wages analyzed in the BEE model, accounts by itself for about half of the 
decline in real output from 1929 to 1933.  Unlike the BEE model findings, the wedge model 
matches up well with the post 1933 period.  The combination of efficiency and labor wedges 
together seem to fit the output data from 1929 to 1933 very closely.   Meanwhile, the investment 25 
 
wedge, which might be associated with Bernanke’s emphasis on the costs of credit 
intermediation related to bank failures, has very little explanatory power in the 1930s.  Cole and 
Ohanian (2005, 32) argue that the BEE (2000) model overstates the impact of monetary policy 
because it includes only the sticky wage-monetary policy shock channel and does not incorporate 
the other wedges included by Chari, Kehoe, and McGratton (2005, 2002) .    Meanwhile, Cole 
and Ohanian (2005) analyze the experience of 17 countries during the Depression using a real 
business cycle model.  They find that about one-third of the international Depression is 
accounted for by monetary shocks and two-thirds by productivity shocks.   
Lawrence Christiano, Robert Motto, and Massimo Rostagno (2003) build a DSGE model 
to account for the Depression using data from the 1920s and 1930s.   They argue that economic 
actors shifted their preferences in favor of more liquidity, which led them to shift away from 
holding time deposits to holding cash.  They develop a monetary rule that would have called for 
a temporary increase in the money growth in periods after a negative shock.  The rule could not 
call for money growth in the same period as the negative shock because short term interest rates 
were near zero.  The zero-bound made contemporaneous money supply growth an ineffective 
policy tool.   Their simulations suggest that this post-shock monetary growth response rule 
would have prevented about 80 percent of the decline between 1929 and 1933 and improved the 
rate of the recovery.  They also ran simulations of a monetary growth rule in which the growth 
rate was held constant over the period.  The results suggest that following a consistent growth 
rate rule would have done little to lessen the Depression.  Finally, they do not find support for 
Friedman and Schwartz’s claim that the Fed could have staved off most of the Depression by 
preventing the drop in M1 in 1930 seen in Figure 6.       26 
 
  Gauti Eggertsson (2009, 2007) builds another DSGE model based on the insights of Peter 
Temin and Barry Wigmore (1990).  The scholars argue for a strong role for deflationary shocks 
as a major cause of the Great Depression.  To turn the economy around, the Roosevelt 
administration and the Federal Reserve had to change course sharply with a combination of new 
policies that would lead to inflation.  This shock to the public’s expectations could cause the 
economy to recover.   
  To promote recovery and have a causal effect, it was not enough to announce new efforts 
by the Fed to raise the money supply.  Interest rates on short term Treasury bills were near zero 
and could go no lower.  Further, the Fed’s past actions meant that there were no guarantees that it 
would not reverse the policy in the future.   Only a complete reversal of the policy dogma of the 
day would work as shock therapy to convince the public that future policy would no longer be 
deflationary.  Expectations about future policy were the key.  The move off the Gold standard 
freed the Fed and the economy from the “Golden Fetters” that had prevented an inflationary 
policy.  The willingness to ramp up government spending signaled that the money supply would 
have to be raised further to monetize the new federal debt to be issued.  Eugene Meyer, the new 
leader of the Fed, was known for his prior actions in combating bank failures.   
  The timing of changes in output fits the story.  Seasonally-adjusted industrial production 
in Figure 7 spiked in April, May, June, and July, although it then declined in the latter half of the 
year.   Real GNP returned to its 1929 peak in 1937 in Figure 6.   In Eggertsson’s (2009) dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, a continuation of the Hoover administration 
policies of small government, adherence to the Gold standard, and balanced budgets would have 
implied that real income would have dropped from 30 percent below the 1929 level in 1933 to 49 
percent below in 1937.   The simulation with the new policy regime leads to a rise in real output 27 
 
that can account for as much as 80 percent of the difference between the extremely low 
counterfactual prediction in output in 1937 and the actual output in that year.   
Given that short-term nominal interest rates remained very close to the zero bound 
between 1933 and 1938, Eggertsson and Benjamin Pugsley (2006) argue that they can use a 
similar DSGE model with low interest rates to explain why the U.S. fell back into recession in 
1937-1938.   They argue that the recession was the result of the public’s perception that the 
Roosevelt administration was returning to a deflationary policy.  Anybody paying attention 
might have thought so.  The Fed raised reserve requirements in 1936 and 1937 and the federal 
government reduced government spending between in the fiscal years 1937 and 1938.  
Simulations from their model suggest that the sharp change to deflationary expectations driven 
by the new policies was a prime contributor to a GNP reduction of 9 percent and a deflation of 
11 percent.   
  The most recent development in the study of the causal effects of monetary policy has 
been a focus on the impact of monetary policy on individual banks and the impact of bank 
failures on economic activity.   Using state level information and an instrumental variable 
strategy to control for endogeneity, Thomas Garrett and David Wheelock (2006) find that 
changes in per capita income have a strong positive correlation with bank failures across states in 
the 1920s.    
Meanwhile, Gary Richardson and William Troost (2009) have used quasi-experimental 
techniques to examine the effects of different policy regimes followed by the Atlanta and the St. 
Louis regional Federal Reserve Banks in the state of Mississippi.  Atlanta, which oversaw 
southern Mississippi, followed Bagehot’s rule for banking panics.  This meant acting quickly as 28 
 
a lender of last resort to provide liquidity to prevent solvent banks faced with deposit runs from 
failing and dragging healthy banks with them.  St. Louis, which oversaw northern Mississippi, 
followed the “real bills” doctrine that the supply of credit should contract in recessions because 
less credit was required to sustain economic activity.  During panics through July 1931 the St. 
Louis Fed tended to limit lending and demanded extra collateral for loans. 
 Richardson and Troost (2009) use a variety of methods to ensure that banks in both Fed 
districts in Mississippi were similar on all dimensions, so that only differences in the Fed policies 
would lead to differences in bank failure rates.   They show that during the banking crisis of 
November 1930 bank failures rates were significantly higher under the St. Louis Fed’s tighter 
policy regime in northern Mississippi than under the Atlanta Fed’s looser regime in southern 
Mississippi.  When the St. Louis Fed shifted to follow policies more consistent with the Atlanta 
Feds in mid-1931, the difference in failure rates went away.   They then show a causal link to 
real measures of output by showing that declines in wholesale trade in Mississippi tend to follow 
closely behind a set of bank failures.     
Federal Fiscal Policy:  Spending and Taxation at the National Level 
Nearly all of the discussion of macroeconomic policy by macroeconomists focuses on 
monetary policy because the Hoover and Roosevelt Administrations ran relatively small deficits 
throughout the 1930s.   Both administrations increased government spending.  However, tax 
revenues also increased markedly during both administrations.       
Most observers do not realize how much the Hoover administration increased 
government spending.  One reason is that Hoover remained a staunch advocate for balanced 
budgets throughout his Presidency.  Unlike Roosevelt, Hoover did not trumpet spending 29 
 
increases through new work-relief programs and public works programs.  Instead, he expanded 
existing programs by doubling federal highway spending and increasing the Army Corps of 
Engineers river and harbors and flood control spending by over 40 percent.
6  Hoover dam, which 
was set in motion before the Depression hit, also contributed a great deal to enhanced public 
works spending.  The Hoover administration and Congress ramped up nominal federal 
expenditures in Figure 9 by 52 percent from $3.1 billion in fiscal year 1929 to $4.7 billion in 
1932 and $4.6 billion in fiscal year 1933.   After adjusting for the deflation in the early 1930s in 
Figure 10, real government spending in the Hoover era peaked at over 88 percent above the 1929 
level in 1932 and 1933.  In these figures 1933 is considered a Hoover year because the spending 
and taxes are reported for a fiscal year that ran from July to June and Roosevelt’s spending did 
not ramp up until July 1933.   
As the Hoover administration raised spending, tax revenues fell, and the federal budget 
fell into its first deficits since World War I.  The Hoover administration ran deficits because 
nominal and real tax revenues fell after 1930, largely because the economy was falling apart and 
despite Hoover’s desire to maintain a balanced budget.  Congress and the Hoover Administration 
tried to reverse the drop in tax revenues, partly by a “soak the rich” tax increase under the 
Revenue Act of June 6, 1932.  Less than 10 percent of households earned enough to pay income 
taxes throughout the 1930s because individuals with less than $2000 in income and families of 
                                                            
6Nominal road spending under the Agriculture Department rose from $95 million in 1929 to 
$207.2 million in 1932, while spending on rivers and harbors rose from $83 million in 1929 to 
$121 million in 1931 to $118 million in 1933 (U.S. Bureau of the Census Statistical Abstract of 
the United States for the years 1931 (pp. 180-182), 1933 (pp. 165-7), 1934 (pp. 165-7);  U.S. 
Department of Treasury 1931, pp. 435-42).  In many cases the new Roosevelt agencies built 
roads and performed work on rivers, harbors, and flood control that could have just as easily 
been assigned to the highway departments and the Army Corps of Engineers.   30 
 
four with less than $5,000 were exempt.  Those who were required to pay saw their tax rates 
jump sharply.  For example, individuals earning between $2,000 and $3,000 saw their rates rise 
from 0.1 percent to 2 percent.  The rate rose from 0.9 to 6 percent for incomes from $10 to $15 
thousand, and the top rate rose from 23.1 to 57 percent for those earning over a million.  Families 
of four did not pay taxes until their incomes reached $5,000.  Those above $5,000 saw their rates 
rise across income categories in a similar fashion.   The tax on corporations rose from 12 to 
13.75 percent   (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975, pp. 1111;  Revenue Act of 1932).    
The rise in income tax rates did little to stem the drop in tax revenues because receipts 
from household and corporate income taxes and estate taxes fell 37 percent from $1.1 billion to 
780 million between 1932 and 1933.  The only reason total tax collections in Figure 9 stayed 
roughly the same in 1932 and 1933 was an extra $311 million in revenue delivered by the 1932 
Revenue Act’s new excise taxes on oil pipeline transfers, electricity, bank checks, 
communications, and manufacturers—particularly, autos, tires, oil, and gasoline (U.S. Bureau of 
the Census 1975, 1107 and 1111; Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1933, 14-15).        
After the Roosevelt’s landslide win, the Roosevelt administration and the new 
Democratic Congress proceeded to raise annual nominal government spending in Figure 9 by $2 
billion to roughly 6.5 billion in both fiscal 1934 and 1935, and then reached a temporary peak in 
1936 at $8.4 billion.  After a reduction to $6.8 billion over two years, the spending ramped up 
again to $8.8 billion in 1939.   Yet, only the deficits of 1934, 1936, and 1939 in Figures 9 and 10 
are much larger than Hoover’s 1932 and 1933 deficits.   
Why?  Tax receipts in Figure 9 rose steadily from 1933 through 1938 before tailing off 
slightly.   Much of the rise reflects an increase in income tax and excise tax collections 31 
 
associated with the recovery.    Income tax rates largely remained at the new higher levels.   The 
Roosevelt administration readjusted the household income tax rates slightly in the Revenue Act 
of 1934 by lowering the rates paid by individuals earning between $2,000 and $20,000 by a few 
tenths of a percent and raising them a few tenths for people between $20,000 and $1 million with 
similar adjustments for families.  In the Revenue Act of 1936 the tax rate was raised from 31.4 to 
33.4 on individuals and families earning more than $100,000 and from 57.2 to 68 for individuals 
and families with more than $1 million in income.   In fiscal years 1934 and 1935, the 
administration temporarily collected 23 and 16 percent of its revenues from Agricultural 
Adjustment Act processing taxes used to pay farmers to take land out of production.    By the 
time the AAA was declared unconstitutional in 1936, excise taxes on new alcohol sales after the 
end of Prohibition had risen to $505 million, roughly 14 percent of tax revenues. (Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue 1934, 76-77;  1935, 82-83; 1936; U.S. Bureau of Census 1975, 1107). 
The Hoover and Roosevelt administrations ran deficits in most years, but economists do 
not consider them to be Keynesian stimulus attempts because the deficits were small relative to 
the economic declines during the 1930s.  At the time John Maynard Keynes was introducing his 
theories that the economy could be brought out of a low employment equilibrium by increasing 
government spending and lowering taxes and thus increasing government budget deficits.  Even 
though Roosevelt had ramped up spending, Keynes chastised him for not doing enough to 
stimulate the economy.  In an open letter carried in several newspapers in December 1933 
Keynes announce that more spending was not enough.  Roosevelt needed to reduce taxes and run 
large federal budget deficits.
7  Writing in 1941, Alva Hansen, a major figure in aiding the 
                                                            
7In the Los Angeles Times on December 31, 1933 Keynes wrote.  Thus, as the prime 
mover in the first stage of the technique of recovery, I lay overwhelming emphasis on the 
increase of national purchasing power resulting from governmental expenditure which is 32 
 
diffusion of Keynesian thought in the economics profession stated.  “Despite the fairly good 
showing made in the recovery up to 1937, the fact is that neither before nor since has the 
administration pursued a really positive expansionist program…For the most part the federal 
government engaged in a salvaging program and not in a program of positive expansion (quoted 
in Brown 1956, p. 866).”   
E. Cary Brown (1956) and Larry Peppers (1973) carefully examined whether the deficits 
were large enough to help the economy reach a target of full employment in a Keynesian model, 
and concluded that they fell well short.   The magnitudes of the federal government spending and 
the federal deficits compared with the size of the income drop shown in Figure 10 show why.  
The income drop is measured as the difference between real GNP (in $1958) in each year and the 
1929 full-employment peak of $203.6 billion.  The 1933 Real GNP was $62.1 billion below its 
1929 level in 1958 dollars, while the real budget deficit was only $2 billion.  In 1934 a $5 billion 
dollar deficit was matched with a GNP shortfall of $49.3 billion; in 1935 the $4.5 billion dollar 
deficit was offsetting a $34.1 billion shortfall.  The figures look strongest in 1936 when a 7.5 
billion deficit was matched with a $10.6 billion GNP shortfall.  Keynesians argue that budget 
deficits have multiplier effects.  For these deficits to be meaningful at returning to full 
employment, the multiplier effects would have had to have been much larger than the multiplier 
estimates of two proposed by the most ardent Keynesians.
8   
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
financed by loans and is not merely a transfer through taxation from existing incomes.  Nothing 
else counts in comparison with this.”  Barber (1996, pp. 52, 83-4) discusses the relationship 
between Keynes and Roosevelt and the economic thinking of Roosevelt’s Brains Trusters.  
Among Roosevelt’s advisers, there were several who also argued for using government programs 
as a stimulus but they followed a different logical path for their arguments. 
8 The extent to which fiscal policy is stimulative involves more complex calculations than 
the ones described here.  E. Cary Brown (1956) and Larry Peppers (1973) find that the New Deal 33 
 
There still remains a question as to whether large federal deficits would have done much 
to increase real output and reduce unemployment.  Christina Romer (1992) estimated fiscal and 
monetary multipliers for the period using a simple equation where  
Output Changet =  βM (Monetary Change)t-1 + βF (Fiscal Change)t-1      3) 
She argues for a year lag in the impact of policy and then picks two years where she could 
plausibly argue that monetary and fiscal policies were not designed to offset declines in the real 
economy.  Romer picks output years 1921 and 1938 and thus policy years 1920 and 1937.   In 
both cases she argues that Federal Reserve policy was independent and not focused on the 
economy.  There was much less federal spending in 1937 than in 1936 because of the one-time 
payout of the veterans’ bonus in 1936 over Roosevelt’s veto.  After plugging values in for these 
two years she finds a monetary multiplier of 0.823 that is much larger in magnitude than the 
fiscal multiplier of -0.233.  The fiscal multiplier is negative because a stimulatory policy would 
be a situation where the spending minus taxes is negative, hence a deficit.   Based on these 
calculations, the fiscal deficit would not have done much. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
deficits were even less stimulative than the raw numbers shown here suggest.  In fact, Peppers 
argues that Hoover was following more stimulative fiscal policies than Roosevelt.  Any impact 
that the federal government deficits had in promoting recovery had to compete with the 
contractionary changes in state and local government budgets after 1933.   Prior to 1933, state 
and local governments generally held nearly full responsibility for relief of the indigent and the 
unemployed.  By 1933 state and local governments were overwhelmed by these and other 
responsibilities in the midst of a sharp decline in their revenues.  A number were forced to run 
short-term deficits in the early 1930s.  Yet state constitutions generally require balanced year-to-
year budgets.  To repay the budget shortfalls and also the debt issued during the early 1930s, 
state and local governments began raising taxes and establishing new taxes after 1933.  The 
problem was further exacerbated when the federal government dumped responsibility for direct 
relief to “unemployables” back onto the state and local governments in 1935 after two years of 
extensive spending.  Thus, in the latter half of the 1930s, state and local governments were often 
running small surpluses. 34 
 
  Eggertsson (2009, 2008) sees Roosevelt’s shift to a fiscal deficit in 1933 as having large 
effects because it is part and parcel of the overall program to reflate the economy by going off of 
the gold standard and using more expansionary monetary policy.  In his view the deficit serves as 
a commitment device that aids in convincing the public that the government will continue to run 
expansionary monetary policy to monetize the debt created.  Thus, the deficit is a contributor to a 
change in expectations about future policy that will have large real effects.  It is important to 
note, however, that Eggertsson’s deficit arguments have to rely on the federal spending and 
deficit changes being part of a larger package with changes in Federal Reserve monetary policy.  
If spending more and running larger deficits were enough to reverse deflationary expectations by 
themselves, Hoover’s doubling of spending and the presence of federal deficits in 1932 and 1933 
should have helped boost the economy before Roosevelt was inaugurated.   
Federal Spending and Its Impact on State and Local Economies 
  In the past few years there has been an explosion of work about New Deal spending 
policies that address the impact of the New Deal spending programs at the state, local, and 
county level.   The results of these studies are reported in Table 1.  One key insight to the papers 
is the importance of thinking about the purpose of the federal grants distributed and the terms on 
which they were distributed.  For example, Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor (2005, 2006) find that 
public works and relief grants contributed to increases in economic activity and to net in-
migration into areas while AAA farm payments had slightly negative effects.  The public works 
and relief grants had positive effects because they simultaneously provided employment, extra 
income, and public goods that raised productivity in the areas.   The AAA payments 
automatically had a crowding-out feature to them because they were designed to take agricultural 
land out of production in an attempt to lower output and raise farm prices nationally.  The 35 
 
farmers who received the payments may have benefited, but this likely came at the expense of 
farm workers and croppers who lost employment or saw their wages decline due to the drop in 
demand for labor.    
A series of papers offer conflicting pictures of the impact of relief programs on private 
employment in the 1930s.  Studies of cross-sectional data using Instrumental Variable estimation 
by Robert Fleck (1999) for county data in 1937 and 1940 and by John Wallis and Daniel 
Benjamin (1981) using city data in 1934/1935 suggest that areas with higher relief employment 
did not experience a reduction in private employment.  On the other hand, studies using panel 
data sets, which allow the research to take advantage of variation across time within locations 
while controlling for nationwide shocks in different years, find some degree of crowding out that 
varies across time.  In the early years of the decade when unemployment was at its peak above 
20 percent, Kent Matthews and Daniel Benjamin (1992) find that the addition of one work relief 
job reduced private employment by about one-third of a job, while Todd Neumann, Price 
Fishback, and Shawn Kantor (2010) find a slight positive effect of relief spending on private 
employment.  After 1935, when unemployment rates fell below 20 percent, both studies find that 
an additional work relief job was associated with a reduction of up to nine/tenths of a private job.   
Fishback and Valentina Kachanovskaya (2010) recently have estimated a New Deal 
fiscal multiplier at the state level.  They examine the impact of net federal spending per capita 
(federal spending minus taxes) on state personal income per capita in an annual panel of states 
for the years 1930 through 1940.   In estimates that control for the endogeneity of the distribution 
of funds using state and year fixed effects and state-specific time trends, the results show a slight 
negative relationship between net federal spending and per capita income.  They then add to the 
analysis an instrument for net federal spending that uses a combination of trends in spending 36 
 
outside the region and measures of swing voting.  The multiplier estimates using the IV 
procedure with state and year effects range from 0.91 to 1.72, depending on how federal 
spending is defined.  The multiplier for federal grants was 1.45, but only .91 when federal 
spending includes both grants and loans.    When effects are estimated separately for AAA farm 
grants and nonAAA farm grants the multiplier for the farm grants is -0.57 and the multiplier for 
the nonAAA grants is 1.72.        
Tax Rates and the Supply-side  
The supply-side features of fiscal policy changes involving tax rates in the 1930s have 
not been investigated in great depth.   Nearly all of the changes called for increased tax rates, 
which likely retarded the growth of the economy.  The Hoover administration has been rightfully 
tarred for its attempts to raise tax rates.  Although less than 10 percent of households paid 
income taxes, the rise in income tax rates for households with more than $1 million in earnings 
in 1932 was confiscatory and likely led to extensive tax avoidance.   Given that the economy was 
falling further in 1932 and 1933, it is hard to sort out how much of the drops in income tax and 
estate tax collections were caused by the economy declining and how much were due to tax 
avoidance.  Some of the decline in the economy might well have been driven by the high rates 
(Piketty and Saez, 2003).   The Roosevelt administration did little to reduce the tax rates in 1934 
and then jacked the top rate still higher in 1936.   
Other new federal taxes created additional distortions.  The new excise taxes on 
manufacturers established in the 1932 act contributed to inefficiencies in the economy.  William 
Lastrappes and George Selgin (1997), for example, find that the two-cent tax on checks from 
1932 to 1934 led households to shift significantly toward holding money in the form of currency 37 
 
rather than in the form of checking accounts in banks.  The National Industrial Recovery Act of 
1933 instituted a tax on capital stock, dividends, and excess profits that was collected through the 
rest of the 1930s.  These taxes typically led to the collection of roughly $100 million to $150 
million in revenue, about 2 to 3 percent of total federal receipts (Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937, Table 1).  In 1936 the federal government added a surtax on 
profits not distributed as dividends.  It rose progressively as a function of the percentage of 
earnings retained out of corporate income, from 7 percent on the first 10 percent retained up to 
27 percent on retentions above 60 percent of income.  The surtax was reduced in 1938 and 
expired in December 1939.   The undistributed profits tax delivered $145 million in tax revenue 
in 1936 and $176 million in 1937 (Calomiris and Hubbard 1993).    
Although the amounts of revenue collected were relatively small, all of these taxes likely 
led to distortions in investment spending.  Calomiris and Hubbard (1993) studied the investment 
and cash flow decisions of 273 publicly-traded manufacturing firms.   As might be expected the 
share of income retained as earnings by companies fell from 23 percent in 1935 to 15 percent in 
1936 and 1937.   However, nearly one-fourth of the companies held enough earnings to pay the 
highest marginal rate of 27 percent.  These companies tended to be smaller firms in the fastest 
growing industries who faced more difficulty in finding external financing.  Thus, it appears that 
the undistributed profits tax led to significant distortions in investment decisions.  
The final tax to consider is one that was clearly not designed to raise revenue.  The 
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 raised taxes on imports substantially on top of an earlier rise 
in 1922.  The goal was to protect American manufacturers from competition from foreign 
imports.  International trade was a small enough percentage of the American economy at the time 
that most economists ascribe the tariff a secondary role as a contributor to the Depression in the 38 
 
U.S.  However, it had far worse implications at the international level.  The Smoot-Hawley tariff 
was matched by a series of protectionist measures by countries throughout the world.  As each 
nation tried to protect its home production interests through higher tariffs and restrictions on 
imports, world trade spiraled downward.  By 1933 the total imports for 75 countries had fallen to 
roughly one-third of the level seen in 1929 (Kindleberger 1986).    
The Roosevelt administration contributed to a recovery in world trade by relaxing these 
tariff barriers.  The Reciprocal Trade Agreement (RTA) Act of 1934 freed the Roosevelt 
administration to sign a series of tariff reduction agreements with key trading partners.  
Agreements with Canada, several South American countries, Britain and key European trading 
partners loosened the trade restrictions markedly.  As a result, American imports rose from a 20-
year low in 1932-1933 to an all-time high by 1940.
9     
Current Policy in Light of 1930s Policy    
  Nearly all agree that the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy was disastrous on a variety of 
dimensions.   The only disagreements relate to why the Federal Reserve followed the path it did 
and how large the causal effects were.  On the fiscal side, the Hoover and Roosevelt 
administrations both increased federal spending, but tax revenues rose enough that they ran 
                                                            
9For historical comparisons of the impact of tariff rates, see Irwin (1998).  Kindleberger 






relatively small deficits.   Since less than 90 percent of households paid income taxes, most of 
the supply-side distortions came from the extraordinarily high tax rates of over 57 percent paid 
by households with over one million dollars in income (roughly 16 million in today’s dollars) 
after 1932.   The capital stock, dividend, and undistributed profits taxes contributed to distortions 
in investment decisions that have not been explored very fully.  Meanwhile, the Hawley-Smoot 
tariff is largely considered to be a major mistake that greatly harmed world trade. 
 There is no doubt that the policies of the 1930s are influencing the policies developed 
during the financial meltdown of 2007-2008 and the Great Recession of 2008-2009.    Federal 
Reserve Chairman Benjamin Bernanke has long been known for his work on the 
macroeconomics of the Great Depression.  Bernanke and Treasury Secretaries Henry Paulson 
and Timothy Geithner have followed strategies that were the antithesis of Fed policy in the 
1930s.   The Federal Reserve of the 1930s did lower discount rates, but the high rates of deflation 
left real interest rates at double-digit levels not seen since.  The Fed waited for three years, as 
unemployment rose above 10 percent, then 16 percent, and then 20 percent, before making a 
large-scale open market purchase of $1 billion.   In contrast, Bernanke ran open market 
operations that expanded liquidity and drove the federal funds rate close to zero before the 
unemployment rate passed seven percent in 2008.  The Fed has continued the liquidity expansion 
by buying large amounts of mortgaged backed securities.    
To prevent shocks from failures that they believed would topple the financial system, the 
Fed and Treasury tore pages out of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) playbook.  
They brokered mergers and bailouts of Bear Stearns, AIG, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac.  They 
used Temporary Asset Replacement Program (TARP) funds to take investment stakes and 
guarantee assets in banks, made loans to auto companies and then developed stress tests of the 40 
 
banks similar to those of the 1933 Bank Holiday before allowing banks to buy out the 
government’s interest.  Given descriptions by the principals of how close to failure these 
institutions were, the monetary policy changes and emergency policies seem necessary and may 
well have staved off a financial meltdown that could have touched off a severe Depression.  We 
will never know for sure because so many events occurred in such a short time frame that there is 
not enough variation to identify what the counterfactual would have been had the Fed and 
Treasury not acted.   
It will take some more time before we see the actual cost of these moves, but the losses 
will likely be small relative to the reserves promised, and the government might even earn a 
profit on the transactions.  There are two major issues to address associated with these moves.  
First, do we want the federal government so heavily involved in financing the economy?   Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, which were supposed to have been independent corporations since the 
1970s, are now essentially government-owned enterprises that finance or guarantee the vast 
majority of new mortgage loans.  Second, the bailouts and backing provided for the Great 
Recession have likely created moral hazard problems, in which financial institutions take more 
risks in the future while anticipating another government bailout.  Congress continues to struggle 
with this issue in trying to set regulations to insure that no financial institutions are too big to 
fail.  Arguments have been made to limit the size of commercial banks, or instead limit the types 
of investments, or even just leave the banks alone.  It is a thorny issue and well-known 
economists have argued for each of the positions (Wessel 2010).    
 On the fiscal side, Great Depression scholar Christina Romer is the current head of the 
President’s Council of Economic Advisors.   Here again, the Obama administration and the 
Democratic Congress has gone in the opposite direction from the Hoover and Roosevelt 41 
 
administrations.  The new leaders built on a deficit that had been rising under George Bush by 
passing a sizeable fiscal stimulus package that raised the deficit to 9.9 percent of GDP in 2009 
from 3.3 percent in 2008.   Even after excluding the budget impact of the Troubled Assets Relief 
Program (TARP) the 2009 deficit was roughly 8.9 percent of GDP.
10  The anticipated deficit for 
fiscal 2010, ending on September 30, 2010 is 10.6 percent.  The U.S. is flying blind with a deficit 
of this size because previous experiments with large fiscal deficits have been on the order of five 
to six percent of GDP.
11   In the case of the Reagan-Bush era of 1980-1992 the economic logic 
underlying the deficits was an emphasis on the supply-side effects of lower tax rates on income.  
Some think that World War II offers an example of a situation where fiscal stimulus 
worked.  But the World War II analogy is highly misleading for any discussion of a peace-time 
economy.  The deficits were run during an all-out war when 40 percent of GDP was spent on 
munitions, the military made most of the allocation decisions in the economy, over 15 percent of 
the workforce was in harm’s way in the military, there were widespread wage and price controls, 
and rationing ruled the day.   In essence, the World War II deficit experience tells us more about 
                                                            
10The bailouts and ownership stakes taken by the Treasury and Fed are not easily measured in 
the budget figures.  Since the assets and ownership stakes have value and many of the loans will 
likely be repaid, the actual Treasury costs could be quite low or the government could turn a 
profit.  The listed federal outlays under the TARP in fiscal 2009, October 1 2008 to September 
30, 2009, were $151 Billion, which was about 1 percent of GDP or roughly 10 percent of the 
budget deficit.  The outlay was substantially less than the earlier forecast outlay of $247 billion.  
The Obama administration predicts that the net cost to the Treasury will fall further once loans 
are repaid and assets resold.  See Office of Management and Budget (2010, 152 for the actual 
2009 figure and Office and Management and Budget (2009, 117) for the forecast.  It is hard to 
see signs of the bailout of Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, and AIG in the budget figures. 
 
11 Deficit figures were downloaded on June 11, 2010 from the U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget website, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historicals/. 
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fiscal stimulus in the Soviet Union’s command economy during the Cold War than it does about 
the modern U.S. mixed economy.       
Even as an exercise in pure government spending the current situation looks quite 
different from the Great Depression.  A large share of federal government spending in the 1930s 
was spent on income maintenance programs and work relief, and the federal government 
spending started at only 4 percent of GDP at the start of the decade.  With a much larger safety 
net already in place in the current era, federal spending has risen from 20 to 25 percent of GDP.  
The most famous program of the 1930s, the Works Progress Administration, would not be 
acceptable today, because most people today receive unemployment insurance benefits that pay 
roughly the same share of income as the WPA, but without the WPA’s requirement that they 
work construction to get the benefits.   
There is no doubt that the Great Recession has been one of the two most serious post-war 
recessions.  Unemployment rates have exceeded 9 percent for more than a year, and real GDP 
went through a year-long decline between the peak in the second quarter of 2008 and the trough 
in the second quarter of 2009.  However, the current fiscal stimulus response seems to be out of 
proportion to the problem, especially when the lost output and unemployment are compared with 
the Great Depression.  The U.S. in 2007 started at average GDP per capita levels that were five 
times higher than in 1929.  Inflation rates are as low as they have ever been, and the U.S. is not 
experiencing the large non-neutral deflation of the 1930s.  By the time the fiscal stimulus 
package was passed in February 2009, the impending financial disaster of fall 2008 had largely 
passed.  Real GDP turned upward in the second quarter of 2009 before very much of the fiscal 
stimulus money had been passed out.  By the first quarter of 2010 real GDP had reached 99.4 43 
 
percent of the GDP peak in second quarter 2008, and it is likely that more than half of the 
stimulus money had still not been distributed.    
The major problem is that unemployment rates remain near 10 percent in May 2010.  Yet 
only a small part of the stimulus money is going toward expanded unemployment benefits.  
There are growing worries that the government expansion may be partially crowding out private 
activity.  Many multiplier estimates are significantly less than one, implying that deficits lead to 
crowding out of private employment.  The current fiscal stimulus program seems to be the size 
of response a Keynesian would have called for in the Great Depression, while the changes in the 
size of the federal deficits during the Great Depression seem more like the changes we might 
expect policy makers would make in response to the Great Recession of 2007-2009.
12  Over ten 
years in response to unemployment rates ranging between 10 and 25 percent the Hoover and 
Roosevelt administrations raised the federal debt as a percentage of  GDP by 28 percentage 
points, from 16 percent in 1929 to 44 percent in 1939.   In response to unemployment rates 
ranging from 5 to 10 percent, the U.S. government has achieved a similar rise in the federal debt 
as a percentage of GDP in just three years, from 36 percent in 2007 to an anticipated 64 percent 
at the end of fiscal 2010.    
Going forward, macroeconomic policy makers face two major challenges.  As the 










everybody anticipating a rise in inflation at some point.  Can the Fed effectively soak up this 
liquidity to prevent a raging inflation without causing the kind of second dip recession that 
occurred in 1937 and 1938?      
On the fiscal side, the deficit has risen markedly and the federal government still has not 
yet effectively addressed the long run funding problems with the pay-as-you-go Social Security 
and Medicare programs.  Everybody expects the new health care entitlements to add to those 
funding problems, particularly because Congress is currently trying to restore Medicare 
payments to doctors that were cut in the health reform act to make the act look like it would not 
add to the deficit.  We know that budget deficits at 10 percent of GDP are not sustainable.   
So when will the U.S. start dealing with these budget issues?  Based on Obama’s fiscal 
2011 budget proposal announced in February 2010, it will not be fiscal year 2011.  The budget 
calls for a freeze on discretionary non-security spending, which account for less than one-sixth of 
spending.  Tax rates will rise for high income households, as the Bush tax cuts expire for that 
group.  Financial institutions and investment managers will pay higher taxes, and subsidies for 
oil and gas companies will be reduced.  Based on the experience with the 1932 tax rate increases, 
do not expect a substantial rise in tax collections.  As has been promised in numerous other 
budgets, the administration will attempt to cut waste in government, close loopholes, increase 
IRS enforcement, and create a fiscal commission.  Congress will return to PAYGO rules 
requiring each new spending program to be offset by spending cuts elsewhere, but these have 
been routinely ignored over the past three years.  Meanwhile, the budget offers new tax breaks 
for small business investment and job creation, no expiration of the Bush tax cuts for middle and 
low income people, and subsidies for sustainable energy (Office of Management and Budget 45 
 
2010; Geithner 2010).  The proposed budget looks more like “government business as usual” 
rather than a serious response to dealing with deficits.  
Table 1 
Monthly Measures of Key Aspects of Federal Reserve Policy and Factors that Might 












































Jan-29 18.5  -14 -34 -9 5  -154
Feb-29  24.1 26 -45 -88 5 30
Mar-29  9.2 35 13 -120 5 80
Apr-29  10.4 72 -32 -109 5 35
May-29 15.6  41 -12 -11 5  -48
Jun-29  25.4 23 26 -46 5 22
Jul-29 60.8  17 -32 -24 5  118
Aug-29 6.7  19 8 49 6  -53
Sep-29 9.7  12 10 105 6  -74
Oct-29 12.5  14 -11 108 6  -84
Nov-29 22.3  -20 161 -41 4.5  68
Dec-29 15.5  -82 131 24 4.5  -150
Jan-30 26.5  9 39 -6 4.5  -302
Feb-30 32.4  62 -5 -29 4  -123
Mar-30 23.2  68 60 -39 3.5  -104
Apr-30 31.9  68 -10 20 3.5  -43
May-30  19.4 26 -1 -84 3 16
Jun-30 57.9  18 42 -41 2.5  4
Jul-30  29.8 -18 12 13 2.5 -25
Aug-30  22.8 -16 16 -1 2.5 -12
Sep-30 21.6  10 -2 44 2.5  -25
Oct-30 19.7  24 5 -12 2.5  7
Nov-30  179.9 36 -3 -1 2.5 25
Dec-30 372.1  22 45 73 2  117
Jan-31 75.7  50 3 -51 2  -8546 
 
Feb-31 34.2  12 -44 -104 2  -37
Mar-31 34.3  42 1 21 2  -40
Apr-31 41.7  29 -4 50 2  -21
May-31 43.2  72 -1 -29 1.5  8
Jun-31 190.5  158 11 -23 1.5  25
Jul-31 40.7  -7 64 -42 1.5  -19
Aug-31  180.0 46 38 56 1.5 53
Sep-31 233.5  -254 24 124 1.5  58
Oct-31 471.4  -449 -3 433 3.5  333
Nov-31 67.9  122 -6 -132 3.5  82
Dec-31  277.1 46 50 -220 3.5 79
Jan-32 218.9  -45 -18 -119 3.5  54
Feb-32 51.7  -62 -16 -70 3  20
Mar-32 10.9  37 66 -46 3  -134
Apr-32 31.6  -23 205 -53 3  -109
May-32  34.4 -215 399 -11 3 -119
Jun-32 132.7  -233 284 9 2.5  9
Jul-32  48.7 55 121 10 2.5 28
Aug-32 29.5  114 32 -23 2.5  -72
Sep-32 13.5  105 -2 -3 2.5  -64
Oct-32 20.1  71 3 0 2.5  -59
Nov-32 43.3  76 0 0 2.5  -15
Dec-32 70.9  173 3 0 2.5  -31
Jan-33 133.1  40 -48 -2 2.5  -27
Feb-33 62.2  -174 -2 70 2.5  52
 
Sources:  All values except Fed discount rate are in millions of nominal dollars.  Value of 
Deposits Suspended is from Federal Reserve Bulletin (September 1937, 909).  Change in Federal 
Reserve System Holdings of U.S. Securities, Change in Bills Bought by the Fed, Changes in 
Member Bank Borrowing, and Change in U.S. Gold Stock come from Federal Reserve Bulletin 
(February 1930, 59: March 1931, 127; October 1931, 560; May 1932, 292; June 1932, 352; 
October 1932, 634; March 1933, 136; September 1933, 541; January 1934,14).    New York 





     
Table 2 
Microeconomic Studies of the Impact of Federal Spending Programs at Lower Levels of Aggregation 
 
Program Citation  Effect  Data  Method 
New Deal Relief 
Spending, 1929-1940 
Fishback, Haines, 
and Kantor (2007) 
Death and Birth Rates:  About 
$2 million (in 2000$) in 
additional relief spending 
associated with reduction of 
one infant death, half a 
homicide, one suicide, 2.4 
deaths from infectious disease, 
one death from diarrhea.  A 
one-standard deviation increase 
in relief spending associated 
with 0.82 standard deviation 
rise in general fertility rate   
Panel:  Annual 
averages for 114 cities, 
1929-1940 
Controls for city characteristics, 
city and year fixed effects, 
instruments. 





Crime Rates:  Ten percent rise 
in work relief spending 
associated with 1.5 percent 
reduction in property crime 
rate.  Smaller effect of direct 
relief spending. 
Panel:  Annual 
averages for 81 large 
cities, 1930-1940 
Controls for city characteristics, 
city and year fixed effects, city-
specific time trends, and 
instruments. 
New Deal Emergency 
Relief Employment, 
1937, 1940 
Fleck (1999)  Private Employment:  
Increase of one emergency 
relief job associated with an 
increase in measured 
unemployed but little effect on 
private employment 
Separate Cross Sections 
of County Averages in 
1937 and again in 1940 
Large number of correlates and 
instrument for relief jobs. 48 
 




Wallis and Benjamin 
(1981) 
Private Employment:  Little or 
no effect of FERA cases per 
capita spending on private 
monthly wages.  Little effect of 
FERA average benefits on 
FERA caseloads. 
Cross Section of 52 
cities in fiscal year, 
1934-1935 
In wage equation correlates for 
aggregated demand and prior 
wages.  In case equation 
correlates and instruments for 
FERA benefit levels. 
New Deal Relief 
spending, 1932-1940 
Neumann, Fishback, 
and Kantor (2010 
forthcoming) 
Private Employment:  Positive 
effect of relief spending on 
private employment prior to 
1936.  Negative effect of relief 
spending on private 
employment after 1936. 
Panel of monthly 
averages from January 
1933 through 
December 1939 for 44 
major cities. 
Panel VAR with differencing 
and controls for serial 
correlation.  No endogeneity if 
there is a one-month or more lag 
in effects of each variable on 
other variables. 
Relief Spending, 1930s  Matthews and 
Benjamin (1992) 
Private Employment:  An 
additional New Deal relief job 
crowded out about one-third of 
a private job in 1933 and about 
nine/tenths of a private job in 
1939 
Panel of annual state 
averages, 1932 
Through 1939 
Pooled regressions with controls 
and instruments 




and Kantor (2005) 
Retail Sales:  Dollar increase of 
public works and relief 
spending per capita associated 
with rise in retail sales per 
capita of roughly 40 cents. 
Cross-section of 
Growth rates for U.S. 
Counties, 1929-1939, 
1929-1935, 1933-1939 
Large number of correlates and 
instrument for public works and 
relief. 




and Kantor (2006) 
Net Migration:  Increase in 
public works and relief 
spending leads to increase in 
net migration. 
Cross-section of county 
averages during 1930s. 
Large number of correlates and 
instrument for public works and 
relief. 




and Kantor (2009 
Internal Migration:  Public 
works and relief spending led to 
15 percent more internal 
migration within the U.S. 
Cross-section of 460 
state economic areas, 
1935-1940 
Several correlates and 
instrument for public works and 
relief in a structural choice 
model. 49 
 
New Deal Spending 
and Loans  
Garrett and 
Wheelock (2006) 
State Per Capita Income.  
New Deal spending associated 
with higher per capita income. 
Cross section of 48 
states for growth rate 
from 1929-1939. 
Several correlates and 
Instrument for New Deal 
spending and loans 
Federal Spending 




State per Capita Income.  One 
dollar increase in net federal 
spending associated with $1 to 
$1.5 increase in state per capita 
income.  
Panel of annual data for 
48 states from 1930-
1940 
Weather correlates, state and 
year fixed effects, state-specific 
time trends, and instrument for 






Sources:  Value of Deposits Suspended is from Federal Reserve Bulletin (September 1937, 909).  Change in Federal Reserve System Holdings of 
U.S. Securities and Change in U.S. Gold Stock come from Federal Reserve Bulletin (February 1930, 59: March 1931, 127; October 1931, 560; 




Sources:  New York Federal Reserve Discount Rate is from Federal Reserve Board of Governors (1943, 493).  For sources of Deposits Suspended 








Sources:  Changes in Member Bank Borrowing (Bills Discounted by Fed), Deposits Suspended, and Change in the U.S. Gold Stock are all from 



































Anderson, Richard.  2006.  “Monetary Aggregates” in Historical Statistics of the United States, 
Millennial Edition, Volume 3, edited by Susan Carter, et. al.   New York:  Cambridge 
University Press. 
Atack, Jeremy and Peter Passell.  1994.  A New Economic View of American History from 
Colonial Times to 1940.  2
nd edition.  New York:  Norton and Company. 
Barber, William J.  1996.  Designs within Disorder:  Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Economists, and 
the Shaping of American Economic Policy, 1933-1945.  New York:  Cambridge 
University Press. 
Barro, Robert and Charles Redlick.  2009.   “Macroeconomic Effects from Government 
Purchases and Taxes.”  National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 15369.  
Cambridge, Massachussett.  
Bernanke, Benjamin.  2000.  Essays on the Great Depression.  Princeton, NJ:  Princeton 
University Press, 2000. 
Bernanke, Benjamin.  “Nonmonetary Effects of Financial Crisis in the Propogation of the Great 
Depression.”  American Economic Review (June):  257-76.   
Bernanke, Benjamin and Paul Gertler.  1989.  “Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business 
Fluctuations.”  American Economic Review 79 (1):  14-31. 
Bordo, Michael, Christopher Erceg and Charles L. Evans.  2000.  “Money, Sticky Wages, and 
the Great Depression.”  American Economic Review 90 (December), 1447-1463. 
Brown, E. Cary.  1956, “Fiscal Policy in the ’Thirties:  A Reappraisal,” American Economic 
Review, 46 (December):  857-79. 
Brunner, Karl and Alan Meltzer.  1968. “What Did We Learn from the Monetary Experience in 
the United States in the Great Depression.”  Canadian Journal of Economics 1 (May):  
334-48. 
Calomiris, Charles and Joseph Mason.  2003.  “Fundamentals, Panics, and Bank Distress During 
the Depression.”  American Economic Review 93 (December 2003):  1615-47.   
Chandler, Lester.  America’s Greatest Depression, 1929-1941. 1970.  New York:  Harper & 
Row Publishers. 
Chari, V.V., Patrick Kehoe, and Ellen McGrattan.  2005.  “Business Cycle Accounting.”  Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Staff Report, 328.  April. 
Chari, V.V., Patrick Kehoe, and Ellen McGrattan. 2002.  “Accounting for the Great Depression.”  
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 92 (May):  22-27. 
Christiano, Lawrence, Robert Motto, and Massimo Rostagno.  2003.  Journal of Money, Credit, 
and Banking 35 (December):  1120-1197. 
Cole, Harold, and Lee Ohanian.  2004.  “New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the Great 
Depression:  A General Equilibrium Analysis,” Journal of Political Economy  112 
(August):  779-816.   
Cole, Harold and Lee Ohanian.  1999.  “The Great Depression in the United States from a 
Neoclassical Perspective.”  Federal Reserve Bank oif Minneapolis Quarterly Review 23 
(Winter):  2-24. 
Cole, Harold and Lee Ohanian.  2005.  “Deflation and the International Great Depression:  A 
Productivity Puzzle.”  National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 11237.   
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.  Various years.  Annual Report for the Year Ending June 30.  
Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1933. 62 
 
Eichengreen, Barry.  1992.  Golden Fetters:  The Gold Standard and the Depression, 1919-1939.  
New York:  Oxford University Press, 1992. 
Eggertsson, Gauti.  2008.  “Great Expectations and the End of the Depression.”  American 
Economic Review 98 (4):  1476-1516.  
Eggertsson, Gauti and Benjamin Pugsley.  2006.  “The Mistake of 1937:  A General Equilibrium 
Analysis.”  Monetary and Economic Studies (December):  1-41. 
Federal Reserve Board of Governors.  1943.  Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1914-1941. Washington, 
D.C.:  Government Printing Office.   
Federal Reserve Board of Governors.  Various years.  Federal Reserve Bulletin.  Washington, D.C.:  
Government Printing Office.   
Fishback, Price V., Michael R. Haines and Shawn Kantor.  2007.  “Births, Deaths, and New Deal 
Relief During the Great Depression.”  Review of Economics and Statistics 89 (February):  
1-14. 
Fishback, Price, William Horrace, and Shawn Kantor.  2005.  "The Impact of New Deal 
Expenditures on Local Economic Activity: An  Examination of Retail Sales, 1929-1939." 
Journal of Economic History 65 (March):  36-71. 
Fishback, Price, William Horrace, and Shawn Kantor.  2006.  “Do federal programs affect 
internal migration? The impact of New Deal expenditures on mobility during the  Great 
Depression.”  Explorations in Economic History 43:  179-222. 
Fishback, Price and Valentina Kachanovskaya.  In progress.  “In Search of the New Deal 
Multiplier.”  Working paper. 
Fleck, Robert.  1999b.   “The Marginal Effect of New Deal Relief Work on County-Level 
Unemployment Statistics.”  Journal of Economic History 59 (September):  659-87. 
Friedman, Milton and Anna Schwartz.   1963.   A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-
1960.  Princeton, N.J.:  Princeton University Press. 
Friedman, Milton and Anna Schwartz.   1965.   The Great Contraction 1929-1933.  Princeton, 
N.J.:  Princeton University Press. 
Garrett, Thomas and David Wheelock. 2006.  “Why Did Income Growth Vary Across States 
During the Great Depression.” Journal of Economic History 66 (2006):  456-466. 
Geithner, Timothy.  2010.  Written Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Budget Committee, 
February 4, 2010.  Downloaded on June 13, 2010 from 
http://budget.senate.gov/democratic/testimony/2010/TG_Budget%20Testimony_SBC.pdf 
Hamilton, James.  1987.  “Monetary Factors in the Great Depression.”  Journal of Monetary 
Economics 19 (1987):  145-169. 
Higgs, Robert.  1997.    "Regime Uncertainty: Why the Great Depression Lasted So Long and 
Why Prosperity Resumed After the War," The Independent Review 1 (Spring): 561-590. 
Irwin, Douglas.  1998.  “Changes in U.S. Tariffs:  The Role of Import Prices and Commercial 
Policies.” American Economic Review  88 (September):  1015-1026. 
James, John and Richard Sylla.   2006.  “Interest Rates and Yields” in Historical Statistics of the 
United States, Millennial Edition, Volume 3, edited by Susan Carter, et. al.   New York:  
Cambridge University Press.   
Johnson, Ryan, Shawn Kantor, and Price Fishback.  Forthcoming.  "Striking at the Roots of Crime:  
The Impact of Social Welfare Spending on Crime During the Great Depression," Journal of 
Law and Economics  forthcoming. 
Keynes, John Maynard.  1964.   The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money.  New 
York:  A Harbinger Book, Harcourt, Brace and World Inc..   63 
 
Kindleberger, Charles.  1986.  The World in Depression, 1929-1939.  Revised edition.  Berkeley, 
CA:  University of California Press. 
Mason, Joseph.  2001.  “Do Lenders of Last Resort Policies Matter?  The Effects of the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation Assistance to Banks During the Great Depression.”  
Journal of Financial Services Research 20 (September):  77-95.   
Matthews, Kent and Daniel Benjamin. (1992) U.S. and U.K. Unemployment Between the Wars:  
A Doleful Story. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.   
Meltzer, Alan. 2003.  A History of the Federal Reserve, Volume I:  1913-1951.   Chicago:  
University of Chicago Press. 
Mitchener, Kris. 2005.  “Bank Supervision, Regulation, and Financial Instability during the 
Great Depression.” Journal of Economic History 65 (March):  152-85.  
Mitchener, Kris and Joseph Mason.  2010.  “’Blood and Treasure’:  Exiting the Great Depression 
and Lessons for Today.”  Oxford Review of Economic Policy (October);    ???-????. 
Neumann, Todd, Price Fishback, and Shawn Kantor. 2010. “The Dynamics of Relief Spending 
and the Private Urban Labor Market During the New Deal..” Journal of Economic 
History 70 (March):  195-220.  
Office of Management and Budget.  2009.  A New Era of Responsibility:  Renewing America’s 
Promise.  Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Government Printing Office.  Downloaded on June 
13, 2010 from http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy10/pdf/fy10-newera.pdf 
Office of Management and Budget.  2010.  Budget of the U.S. Government.  Fiscal Year 2011.   
Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Government Printing Office.  Downloaded on June 13, 2010 
from http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/overview/ 
Ohanian, Lee.  2009.  “What or Who Started the Great Depression?”  National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper No. 15258.  Cambridge, MA.   
Parker, Randall E.  Reflections on the Great Depression.  Northampton, MA:  Edward Elgar, 
2002. 
Parker, Randall E.  The Economics of the Great Depression:  A Twenty-First Century Look Back 
at the Economics of the Interwar Era.  Northampton, MA:  Edward Elgar, 2007. 
Peppers, Larry.  1973.  “Full Employment Surplus Analysis and Structural Change:  The 1930s,” 
Explorations in Economic History 10 (Winter), 197-210. 
Piketty, Thomas and Emanuel Saez. 2003.  ”Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-1998.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (February):  1-39. 
Richardson, Gary and William Troost.  2009.  “Monetary Intervention Mitigated Panics During 
the Great Depression:  Quasi-Experimental Evidence from a Federal Reserve District 
Border, 1929-1933.”  Journal of Political Economy (December):  1031-1073. 
Richardson, Gary and Patrick Van Horn.  2009. “Intensified Regulatory Scrutiny and Bank 
Distress in New York City During the Great Depression.” Journal of Economic History 
69 (June):   446-465. 
Romer, Christina D.  1990.  “The Great Crash and the Onset of the Great Depression” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 105 (August ):  597-624. 
_____.  1992.  “What Ended the Great Depression?” Journal of Economic History 52 
(December):  757-84. 
_____.  1999.   “Why Did Prices Rise in the 1930s?” Journal of Economic History 59 (March):   
167-99. 64 
 
Romer, Christina and David Romer.  2006.  “The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes:  
Estimates Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks.”  National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper Number W13264. Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Rothbard, Murray.  2000.  America’s Greatest Depression.  5
th edition.  Auburn, Alabama:  
Ludwig von Mises Institute. 
Smiley, Gene.  2002.  Rethinking the Great Depression:  A New View of Its Causes and 
Consequences.  Chicago, IL:  Ivan R. Dee. 
Sutch, Richard, David.  2006.  “The Great Depression” in Historical Statistics of the United 
States, Millennial Edition, Volume 3, edited by Susan Carter, et. al.   New York:  
Cambridge University Press. 
Taylor, Jason. 2009.  “Work-sharing During the Great Depression:  Did the “President’s 
REemploymnet Agreement” Promote Reemployment?  Economica :  1-26. 
Temin, Peter.  1976.  Did Monetary Forces Cause the Great Depression.  (New York:  W.W. 
Norton. 
Temin, Peter.  1989.  Lessons from the Great Depression.  Cambridge, Mass.:  MIT Press. 
Temin, Peter and Barry Wigmore.  1990.  “The End of One Big Deflation.” Explorations in 
Economic History 27 (October):  483-502. 
U.S. Bureau of the Census.  1975.  Historical Statistics of the United States, 1790 to the Present.  
Washington, D.C.:  Government Printing Office. 
U.S. Bureau of the Census.  Various Years.  Statistical Abstract of the United States.  
Washington, D.C.:  Government Printing Office. 
U.S. Department of Treasury.  Various years.  Annual Report.  Washington, D.C.:  Government 
Printing Office. 
Wallis, John.  2006.  “Federal Government Finances” in Historical Statistics of the United States, 
Millennial Edition, Volume 5, edited by Susan Carter, et. al.   New York:  Cambridge 
University Press. 
Wallis, John Joseph, and Daniel K. Benjamin.  1981.  “Public Relief and Private Employment in 
the Great Depression,” Journal of Economic History  41 (March):  97-102. 
Wessel, David.  2010.  “The ‘Too Big’ Divide on Banks.”  Wall Street Journal.  June 10, 2010, 
downloaded on June 13, 2010 from 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703890904575296430874218148.html?
KEYWORDS=too+big+to+fail 
Wheelock, David.  1991.  The Strategy and Consistency of Federal Reserve Monetary Policy, 
1924-1933.  New York:  Cambridge University Press. 
Wheelock, David.  2006.  “Monetary Policy” in Historical Statistics of the United States, 
Millennial Edition, Volume 3, edited by Susan Carter, et. al.   New York:  Cambridge 
University Press. 
Wicker, Elmus.  1966. Federal Reserve Monetary Policy, 1917-1933.   New York:  Random 
House, 1966. 
 